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DISCOVERY, EVIDENCE, CONFIDENTIALITY,
AND SECURITY PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED
WITH THE USE OF COMPUTER-BASED
LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
HALEY J. FROMHOLZ*
I. INTRODUCTION
Problems arise when a computer is used to organize and retrieve evi-
dence in the form of documents, deposition testimony, or prior trial
testimony during trial preparation and the trial itself; when it is used to
generate indexes and summaries of evidence; and when it is employed to
analyze evidence for trial.
Computer input may be in the form of traditional written documents
entered by keyboard and transformed into machine-readable form,
in electrical impulses transformed by a telephone line from a remote
location, or in computer-readable magnetic tapes, discs, or cards
generated in the course of business. Thus, the original documents may
not be "documents" at all, in the traditional sense.
Because of these pragmatic differences, traditional evidentiary rules
create conceptual difficulties. This Article focuses on the problems of
admissibility of computerized records in general, and the specific ad-
missibility, confidentiality, and security problems which relate to
computerized litigation support systems.
II. EVIDENTIARY PROBLEMS
A. Hearsay Objection-Business Records Exception
Two types of computerized records present admissibility problems:
those generated in the ordinary course of business, and those produced
specifically for use in litigation. The principal objection to their admis-
* LLB., 1967, Duke University; Member of the firm of Morrison & Foerster,
San Francisco and Los Angeles; Chairman, American Bar Association Section of Sci-
ence and Technology, 1976-77; Chairman, State Bar of California Committee on Com-
puters and Law, 1972-74; Lecturer, Practicing Law Institute, 1975-76, on use of com-
puters in complex litigation.
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sibility is based on the hearsay rule.1 Hearsay is a statement, made
by someone other than a witness testifying at the trial or hearing, that
is offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 2  In the criminal
context, strict application of the hearsay rule may violate an accused's
due process right to call witnesses in his own behalf. In Chambers v.
Mississippi,3 the trial judge excluded testimony by three witnesses that
a third party had confessed to the crime for which the defendant was
being tried. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the rejected
testimony "bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness" and that
"[i]n these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting
the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be
applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice."4
Although the proponent of computer-generated records may argue
that they are admissible under the business records exception to the
hearsay rule,5 computerized records differ from traditional, manually
generated records in many respects. Computer data may be in the
form of electrical impulses on magnetic tape or disc, or in magnetic
core or semiconductor. They may be organized according to one
scheme (e.g., by employee number), but printed out in a different
order (e.g., a report showing total dollar compensation by employee
classification). Thus the "record," as printed, may be completely dif-
ferent from any "record" stored in the computer. Nevertheless, under
1. Fed. R. Evid. 802.
2. EnD. R. Evm. 801(c). See generally C. McCoRmIcn, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAw OF EVIDENCE § 244 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
3. 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
4. Id. at 302. Note that the hearsay rule has been relaxed in complex cases.
See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 355 (D. Mass. 1950),
final judgment, 110 F. Supp. 295 (1953), afj'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
5. FED. R. Evw. 803:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the de-
clarant is available as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, rec-
ord, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions
or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by,
a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted busi-
ness activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to make
the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as shown by the
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circunstances of preparation indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
[Vol. 1977:445
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/10
Number 3] LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
the liberal Federal Rule,6 and cases in some other jurisdictions, 7 a
record in machine-readable form is a "record" for purposes of the busi-
ness records exception.
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) provides that the foundation
necessary to admit a business record can be provided by the testimony
of the "custodian or other qualified witness . . . ." The foundation
evidence must disclose that the record is based upon the first-hand
observation of someone whose job it is to know the facts recorded.9
The testimony of more than one knowledgeable person is unnecessary
when a party introduces business records that are generated by a system
involving several persons working according to set procedures.' Thus,
in Massachusetts Bonding & Insurance Co. v. Norwich Pharmacial
Co.," tabulations of sales orders were admitted to prove the amount of
embezzled stamp money on the testimony of one clerk who had par-
ticipated in the tabulations and was familiar with the procedures. The
court noted that greater reliability would not be achieved by requiring
testimony from each clerk involved in the tabulation; they could not
be expected to have a recollection of the particular transactions in-
volved.' 2
6. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 311 (1972): "The expression 'data compilation' is used
as broadly descriptive of any means of storing information other than the conventional
words and figures in written or documentary form. It includes, but is by no means
limited to, electronic computer storage."
7. See People v. Cohen, 59 Cal. App. 3d 241, 130 Cal. Rptr. 656, cert. denied,
97 S. Ct. 748 (1977); Transport Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871
(1965). The evidentiary rules in both of these jurisdictions were taken from the UNI-
FORM BUsiNESs RECORDS AS EVIDENCE AcT [hereinafter cited as UBREA] (superceded
by FED. R. Evm. 803(6)), cited in 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 245 (1975). The
Nebraska court stated: "No particular mode or form of record is required. The statute
was intended to bring the realities of business and professional practice into the court-
room and the statute should not be interpreted narrowly to destroy its obvious useful-
ness." 178 Neb. at 259, 132 N.W.2d at 875.
8. See note 5 supra.
9. See MacLean v. City & County of San Francisco, 151 Cal. App. 2d 133, 143,
311 P.2d 158, 164 (1957) (citing C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 286 at 602); Johnson
v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 170 N.E. 517 (1930); Advisory Committee's Note to FED.
R. Evm. § 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 183, 308-09 (1972).
10. As a California court pointed out, UBREA "is based on the recognition that
records made and relied upon in the regular course of business may be regarded as
trustworthy without verification by all the persons who contribute to them." People
v. Gorgol, 122 Cal. App. 2d 281, 296, 265 P.2d 69, 78 (1953). See Tapper, Evidence
from Computers, 4 RuTGERs J. COMPurERs & L. 324, 372 (1975).
11. 18 F.2d 934 (2d Cir. 1923).
12. Id, at 937-38.Washington University Open Scholarship
448 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Rule 803(6) also requires that the record be "made at or near the
time" of the act, event, or condition."3 This has been interpreted to
mean that the data must be put into the computer and recorded in
computer-readable form within that time frame; it does not, however,
preclude the hard copy printout being made at a later date. In Trans-
port Indemnity Co. v. Seib,14 the printout was admitted even though
it was retrieved from the taped records and printed for the purposes
of trial. The court concluded that the taped record had been made
at or near the time of the events. In United States v. Russo,"5 the
defendant challenged the admissibility of a computer printout because
it had not been prepared at or near the time of the acts which it pur-
ported to describe.-6 The court admitted the printout, however,
finding that it was a presentation in "structured and comprehensible
form of a mass of individual items," which had been recorded con-
temporaneously on reels of magnetic tape.' 7
The element of unusual reliability of business records is supplied by
"systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits
of precision, by actual experience of businesses in relying on them, or
by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or
occupation.""' The computer provides much greater reliability than
a manual system employing experienced clerks; once a program is
debugged, operation of the computer is virtually free from mechanical
and electronic error. The accuracy and trustworthiness of the sys-
13. See note 5 supra.
14. 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
15. 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974).
16. Defendant's challenge was premised on the Federal Business Records Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970) (amended 1975), which is very similar to FED. R. EVID.
803(6), note 5 supra.
17. It would restrict the admissibility of computerized records too severely to
hold that the computer product, as well as the input upon which it is based,
must be produced at or within a reasonable time after each act or transaction
to which it relates.
The Federal Business Records Act was adopted for the purpose of facilitating
the admission of records into evidence where experience has shown them to be
trustworthy. It should be liberally construed to avoid the difficulties of an
archaic practice which formerly required every written document to be authen-
ticated by the person who prepared it. The Act should never be interpreted
so strictly as to deprive the courts of the realities of business and professional
practices.
480 F.2d at 1240 (citations omitted).
18. See Advisory Committee's Note to FfND. R. EvD. 803(6), 56 F.R.D. 183, 308
(citing C. McCORMICK, supra note 2, §§ 281, 286-87).
[Vol. 1977:445
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/10
LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
tern, including program and hardware, can be determined by running
test data. Because the computer's treatment of data is absolutely
uniform, reliability of all future transactions can be assumed from
this test run. It is far safer, therefore, to assume that a computer-
ized system will process data in a reliable and trustworthy manner, than
it is to conclude the same of a manual processing system. The
systematic checking, regularity, and continuity of a manual system are
replaced by the absolute uniformity of a computer that performs
repetitious transactions. For these reasons, businesses rely upon com-
puter output more than manually generated reports.
In King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp.,"0 the account-
ing manager who supervised the maintenance of the computerized ac-
counting records supplied the foundation testimony for the admis-
sion of printouts which indicated the balances due on conditional
sales contracts. Noting that businesses normally rely upon the sort
of records offered by the proponent, the court stated:
[T]here cannot profitably and sensibly be one rule for the business
world and another for the courtroom. The merchant and the manu-
facturer must not be turned away remediless because methods in
which the entire community places a just confidence are a little dif-
ficult to reconcile with technical judicial scruples on the part of the
same persons who, as attorneys, have already employed and relied
upon the same methods. In short, courts must here cease to be pedan-
tic and endeavor to be practical.20
The court admitted the printouts without requiring the testimony of in-
dividuals who made the entries in the regular course of business, once
it was shown:
(1) that the electronic computing equipment is recognized as standard
equipment, (2) the entries are made in the regular course of business
at or reasonably near the time of the happening of the event recorded,
and (3) the foundation testimony satisfies the court that the sources
of information, method and time of preparation were such as to indi-
cate trustworthiness and justify its admission.21
In Olympic Insurance Co. v. H. D. Harrison, Inc.,2  an action by an
insurance company against its agent for not paying over premiums
19. 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
20. Id. at 398 (quoting Grenada Cotton Compress Co. v. Atkinson, 94 Miss. 93,
100-01, 147 So. 644, 646 (1908)).
21. Id.
22. 418 F.2d 669 (5th Cir. 1969).
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which he had collected, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held
that printouts indicating the amount of the account were properly
admitted. Because they had been generated in the ordinary course of
business, the court concluded that the printouts had "a prima facie aura
of reliability."2
In United States v. DeGeorgia,24 a car rental company's computer
printouts showing the absence of rental transactions during the relevant
period were admitted to prove that the defendant had stolen a car.
The rental company's regional security manager relied upon informa-
tion he obtained from the firm's home office to provide the foundation
evidence. Affirming the admissibility of the computer records, the
court stated:
[I]t is immaterial that the business record is maintained in a computer
rather than in company books, this is on the assumption that: (1) the
opposing party is given the same opportunity to inquire into the accur-
acy of the computer and the input procedures used, as he would have
to inquire into the accuracy of written business records, and (2) the
trial court, as in the case of challenged business records, requires the
party offering the computer information to provide a foundation there-
for sufficient to warrant a finding that such information is trustworthy.25
It is especially significant that the computer-generated record was
admitted in DeGeorgia; it was a criminal case and the evidence was
directed against a stranger to the business transaction.
In D & H Auto Parts, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corp.,28 computer
printouts that disclosed fraudulent parts purchases were admitted under
the Federal Business Records Act.2 The Assistant Comptroller of
defendant-corporation testified about his department's procedures for
checking the data from the central data processing department. The
court noted that the documents were routinely prepared for business
purposes rather than for litigation, were prepared from facts supplied
by the plaintiff, and were capable of verification by the plaintiff. It
disposed of plaintiff's objection to the adequacy of the witness' knowl-
edge of Ford's procedures, by acknowledging that although testimony
from other Ford personnel, including the data processing manager,
23. Id. at 670.
24. 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
25. Id. at 893 n.1l.
26. 57 F.R.D. 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970) (amended 1975).
[Vol. 1977:445
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might be shown to affect the weight of the offered evidence, it did not
threaten its admissibility.28
B. Other Objections
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a computer printout is
regarded as an original.29 Some state rules, however, are not so
explicit. The California rule, for example, provides that "no evidence
other than the writing itself is admissible to prove the content of a writ-
ing,"' and a "writing" is defined to include "handwriting, typewriting,
printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of record-
ing upon any tangible thing any form of communication."'"
In King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp.," the defendant-
appellant objected to the introduction of computer printouts. The
court responded that records stored on magnetic tape by data process-
ing machines were useless except in the form of printouts, such as those
introduced as evidence. In admitting the printouts, which reflected the
record stored on the tape, the court said that it was actually following,
rather than departing from, the best evidence rule by extending its
application to electronic record keeping.3  If the court held that a
printout was a copy, the only admissible evidence would be the machine-
readable tape or cards, which are incomprehensible to a human reader.
The Federal Rules provide for admission of summaries in lieu of
voluminous records as long as the underlying records are admissible.3 4
28. Id. at 551. See also Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433,
440 P.2d 314 (1968); Annot., I1 A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967); Tapper, Evidence From Com-
puters, 4 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS & L. 324 (1975).
29. FED. R. EviD. 1001 provides:
(3) Original. An 'original' of a writing or recording is the writing or
recording itself or any counterpart intended to have the same effect by a person
executing or issuing it. An 'original' of a photograph includes the negative or
any print therefrom. If data are stored in a computer or similar device, any
printout or other output readable by sight, shown to reflect the data accurately,
is an 'original.'
30. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1500.
3 1. CAL. EVID. CODE § 250. There is, however, no definition of "original" or case
interpretation of whether a printout is the "writing itself" or a copy. It seems likely
that if the issue is ever raised, the California courts will take the federal approach.
32. 222 So. 2d 393 (Miss. 1969).
33. Id. at 398.
34. FED. R. Evil. 1006:
The contents of voluminous writings, recordings or photographs which cannot
conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation. The originals, or duplicates, shall be made availableWashington University Open Scholarship
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In the interest of fairness, and to facilitate admission at trial, the under-
lying data and all relevant computer input and output should be made
available to the opposing party far in advance of trial. In this way,
both the adverse party and the court can examine the data and resolve
all objections in advance. Even if the litigants fail to agree, the sum-
maries will be admitted if supported by testimony from the data super-
visor or expert which validates the methods used.a'
In Exclusive Florists, Inc. v. Kahn, 0 the court admitted a summary
prepared by plaintiff's vice president which established the cost of work
and materials supplied to defendant. The summary was based upon
plaintiff's purchase orders to, and invoices from, suppliers. The court
admitted the purchase orders as straightforward business records. The
invoices were admissible because they were part of plaintiff's system
of maintaining its business records: they were regularly used in check-
ing shipments for completeness and accuracy, and were checked against
plaintiff's purchase orders at the same time.37  The court did not
require that the source documents actually be admitted.
In Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chemical and
Research, Inc.,3 8 the court affirmed the admission of a summary of
machine-prepared accounting records which had been prepared by the
plaintiff's employee for purposes of the litigation because the underly-
ing records were kept in the ordinary course of business and qualified
as plaintiff's business records. The court emphasized, however, that
the underlying records had been made available to the defendant for
a year before the trial and were available in court for its inspection.
C. Expert Testimony
The rule that expert opinion must be based on evidence in the case
for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and
place. The judge may order that they be produced in court.
See also FED. R. Evm. 901(b) (9), providing for authentication of a process or system
to show that it produces an accurate result.
35. See 1 Pt. 2 MooRa's FEDERAL PaxcmC 2.711, at 93 (2d ed. 1976).
36. 17 Cal. App. 3d 711, 95 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1971).
37. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1509 also permits admission of summaries of voluminous
writings:
Secondary evidence, whether written or oral, of the content of a writing is not
made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if the writing consists of numerous
accounts or other writings that cannot be examined in court without great loss
of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the
whole; but the court in its discretion may require that such accounts or other
writings be produced for inspection by the adverse party.
38. 82 N.J. Super. 281, 197 A.2d 569 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963).
[Vol. 1977:445
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has been abrogated by the Federal Rules:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases
an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to
him at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by
experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon
the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.30
The new rule broadens the basis for expert opinion by recognizing
that experts, when not in court, base conclusions on information from
numerous sources that would be inadmissible in evidence, or admissible
only at the expense of great time and effort.40 The best evidence rule
does not apply to an expert's testimony which is based on examination
of documents not in evidence."1 In addition, the Federal Rules deviate
from most modem authority in not requiring that the underlying
documents be made available.4
One interpretation of the Federal Rules suggests that inadmissible
materials and information underlying the opinion testimony of an ex-
pert may be brought out on direct examination. 3 Under Federal Rule
705, however, the court has discretion to require disclosure of the
matter upon which the opinion is based, prior to admitting the
testimony. If the data used by an expert are "of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in a particular field," the fact that the underlying
data were processed by computer does not, by itself, require its exclu-
sion. The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 703, 44 however,
expressly warns against the admission of expert opinion evidence which
is not based on data reasonably relied upon by experts in the field.4 5
Coppolino v. State" may provide the basis for admitting expert testi-
mony where the expert relies upon a computer program that embodies
39. FED. R. EviD. 703.
40. See Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvD. 703, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283
(1972).
41. The Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 1002, provides that Rule 703,
by allowing an expert to give an opinion based on matters not in evidence, limits the
application of Rule 1002. See 56 F.R.D. 183, 343 (1972).
42. See P. RoTmsEiN, UNDEsrJANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RuLES oF EVIDENCE
86-87 (1973).
43. Id. at 82-83.
44. 56 F.R.D. 183, 283 (1972).
45. Thus the Advisory Committee noted that Rule 703 "would not warrant admit-
ting in evidence the opinion of an 'accidentologist' as to the point of impact in an
automobile collision based on statements of bystanders.... .Id. at 284.
46. 223 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 1969).
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an analytical technique not yet generally accepted by the relevant com-
munity of scientific experts. In that case, the court exercised its
discretion to admit evidence of a newly devised chemical test that
detected the presence of a rare poison in the deceased's body tissues.
The foundation was laid by the extensive testimony of the doctor who
devised the test.17
The fact that a newly devised test or procedure is performed by a
computer should not in itself create a new problem. The computer
is distinguishable from other devices such as the polygraph or a voice
print machine: The latter are essentially analog devices which pur-
port to detect physical phenomena and convert them to objective
measurements. Such devices have been challenged both on their abil-
ity to detect and to convert information to objective data.
The digital computer, on the other hand, merely performs more
rapidly operations which can be performed manually. The input data
along with the program or a description of it, the program documenta-
tion, and the conclusions reached by running the data against the pro-
gram, can usually be provided to the adversary. With this information,
the, opponent may check the accuracy of the computer program by
running test data and comparing the results with those obtained by
manual computation. In addition, unlike the polygraph and voice print
machine, there is no substantial question of the digital computer's
reliability.
Il. DISCOVERY
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, records in computer-
readable form and those generated by a computer are discoverable to
the same extent as are manual records."' The respondent may be
required to translate the data into a usable form-i.e., by supplying a
printout of the data-when discovery would be impossible otherwise;
the court, however, may protect the respondent from undue burden and
expense by restricting discovery or allocating costs."9 Where the
discovering party must have access to the machine-readable records,
47. Id. at 69-70; see Younger, Computers and the Law of Evidence, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 25, 1975.
48. FaD. R. Civ. P. 34, governing production of documents, expressly applies to
electronic data compilations from which data can be obtained only by the use of detec-
tion devices.
49. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/10
LITIGATION SUPPORT SYSTEMS
the court may protect the other party by requiring measures to pre-
serve the records, ensure their confidentiality, and limit costs.50
The decisions are unclear as to when a party will be required to
process information into the form requested by his opponent.5 1  Some
authorities suggest that the respondent be required to provide a print-
out, subject to the court's discretion to ensure confidentiality and limit
costs, where it has a program to perform that function.52  Authorities
have also suggested that in certain cases the examining party must be
allowed to develop his own programs to analyze the responding party's
data, and to run those programs on the respondent's computer."" This
procedure might result in destruction or alteration of machine-readable
records and must, therefore, be closely supervised; for security pur-
poses, the examining party may be required to bear the cost of duplicat-
ing the records.
In Lodge 743, International Association of Machinists v. United
Aircraft Corp.,54 the defendant delivered 120,000 photocopies of com-
puter-generated records, ostensibly in compliance with the court's order
to answer plaintiff's interrogatories. The court ordered the defendant
to analyze the records at its own expense, in order to make them intel-
ligible to the plaintiff."
In Greyhound Computer Corp. v. IBM, 8 defendant answered
plaintiff's interrogatories by directing plaintiff to materials which
contained the relevant information. Plaintiff's counsel reported that
defendant's "materials" were a room full of documents and, despite his
attempts, he had been unable to secure the information sought in his
50. See Advisory Committee Note to Proposed Amendment to FED. R. Crv. P.
34, 48 F.R.D. 487, 527 (1970).
51. Compare United States v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, 7 F.R.D. 256, 259
(S.D.N.Y. 1946) ("Rule 34 is to be used to call for the production of documents
already in existence, and in the possession or control of an adverse party, and not
to require an adverse party to prepare a written list to be produced for inspection."),
with Van Wagner v. National Container Corp., 16 Fed. Rules Serv. 460 (S.D.N.Y. 1952)
(defendant required to produce list of its customers in three states even though he must
prepare a document to comply and notwithstanding the information could be obtained
from testimony by defendant's president).
52. 1 Pt. 2 MORE's FEDERAL PRACcnE % 2.715, at 103 nn.120-22 and accompanying
text (2d ed. 1976).
53. Id. at 102. See 8 C. WaiGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERA. PRACrICE & PROCEDURE
1 2218 (1970).
54. 220 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn. 1963), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 908 (1964).
55. id. at 21.
56. 3 Computer L. Serv. Rep. [C.L.S.R.] 138 (D. Minn. 1971).
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interrogatories. The defendant also produced, at plaintiff's request,
the information contained on magnetic tapes, but the printout was ex-
pressed in symbols that were not understandable. The court noted its
duty "to strike a balance between requiring a party defendant to make
compilations and tabulations and do extensive research to make answers
and exhibits for his opponents, and the deliberate employment of de-
laying tactics on the part of a defendant designed to impede the
progress of discovery. '5 7  In striking this balance the court denied
plaintiff's motion for more specific answers, but ordered the defendant
to provide the plaintiff with someone familiar with the material to
guide, aid, and assist him, and to furnish printouts of taped material
which would aid in securing the answers.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(3) provides protection for
materials prepared in anticipation of litigation, rendering them discov-
erable "only upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has sub-
stantial need of the materials in the preparation of his case and that
he is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent
of the materials by other meafts." The rule also recognizes a second
level of materials which contain the "mental impressions, conclusions,
opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a
party concerning the litigation," and provides that "the court shall pro-
tect against disclosure" of such second level information. (emphasis
added).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4) provides for discovery of
facts known and opinions held by experts who will testify at trial.
Thus, an expert who is not expected to testify at trial may not be de-
posed nor can information be discovered from him except upon a show-
ing of exceptional circumstances that render it impractical for the party
to obtain discovery or obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by
other means. Exceptional circumstances existed in Pearl Brewing Co.
v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co.58 The plaintiff in that case commissioned
a complex computer simulation econometric model, the results of which
were to form the basis of expert testimony. The court permitted dis-
covery of both the results of the simulation, and the underlying program
and data. In addition, the court authorized the defendants to depose
plaintiff's designated trial expert and two "non-trial" computer experts
who had designed the program because "only these two men appear
57. Id. at 139-40.
58. 415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1977/iss3/10
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to be adequately conversant in technical information to explain this
computer operation."59
In Bituminous Coal,6" before the Interstate Commerce Commission,
a party challenged the admission of cost data developed by an expert
through the use of a computer program, alleging that it did not comply
with the appropriate test of admissibility for machine-run products: the
computer results may be introduced only if the program has been made
available to opposing parties for cross-examination purposes. The Com-
mission adopted a broad definition of "program" and held that the
introducing party had complied with the rule by permitting the objector
to study the source language explanation which enabled it to conduct
a manual computation. Indeed, the reliability of the program could be
tested by manual computation in far less time than is required to an-
alyze the logic of the program.
In United States v. Dioguardi,61 the court held that reversal of a con-
viction was not required where a prosecution witness instructed a
computer to prepare figures which were used to establish the defend-
ant's violation of the bankruptcy laws. Although defendant was en-
titled to the program, the court concluded that the data were so limited
that defense counsel could easily have manually checked the computer
program's correctness. Similarly, in Perma Research & Development
v. Singer Co.,6- the Second Circuit held that the trial judge did not
abuse his discretion by allowing an expert witness to give an opinion
based on results of a computer simulation prepared specifically for liti-
gation even though the opposing side did not have access to the under-
lying data and program. The court agreed that "[w]hile it might have
been better practice for opposing counsel to arrange for the delivery
of all details of the underlying data and theorems employed in these
simulations in advance of trial to . . .avoid unnecessarily belabored
discussion of highly technical, tangential issues at trial," the opposing
side nonetheless did have an adequate basis on which to cross-examine
the expert."3
Under prior case law it was uncertain whether computer programs
and indexes prepared by someone other than the attorney for use in
59. Id. at 1138.
60. 325 I.C.C. 548 (1965).
61. 428 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970).
62. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
63. Id. at 115.
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litigation were protected by Rule 26(b)(3). In Alltmont v. United
States,64 however, the Third Circuit clarified this issue and the result is
embodied in Rule 26(b)(3). The Rule provides protection for materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by another party or by
the party's representative, including his attorney, consultant, surety, in-
demnitor, insurer, or agent.6 5 The burden rests on the party seeking to
invade the other's privacy to justify production; 6 neither relevance6 7
nor an assertion that the information would be helpful to the discovering
party is a sufficient justification. 6  If the index or program contains the
mental impressions, theories, or opinions of the attorney, it will receive
the more stringent, second level, protection provided by Rule 26(b)(3).11
In Montrose Chemical Corp. v. Train,'70 the court confronted the
issue of when indices and factual compilations prepared for use in
litigation are entitled to protection. Disclosure of factual summaries
which had been prepared to assist an administrator in making a com-
plex decision, the court held, would be an "improper probing of the
mental processes behind a decision of an agency."'" The summaries
were compilations of facts introduced in evidence at the hearings and
were thus a matter of public record. The court concluded, however, that
64. 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950).
65. Alltmont thus extended work product protection, first enunciated in Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), to materials prepared by an agent of the attorney. See
4 MooR's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.64[3], at 26-416 (2d ed. 1976) ("Under the new
26.64[3], at 26-416 (2d ed. 1976) ("Under the new language . . . there will be no
language . . . there will be no technical distinction between materials prepared by the
attorney in the case and those prepared by a claim agent, insurer, or other agent of the
party or by the party himself.")
66. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 512 (1947).
67. See Advisory Committee's Note to Proposed Amendments to FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b) (3), 48 F.R.D. 487, 500 (1969) (Advisory Committee's Note).
68. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 557 (2d Cir.
1967).
69. It would not be unusual, at least for an index of information contained in
the computerized data files, to be entitled to this protection. They are typically de-
veloped with the attorney's participation so that the words and word combinations con-
tained therein will adequately express the issues and facts he expects will be significant
in the case.
70. 491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
71. Id. at 68. The case arose in the context of a request for information under
the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), and the court interpreted
exemption (5) under the Act as protecting the "deliberative process" in agency decision-
making, using a standard analogous to the work product rule of FED. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3).
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summarizing and organizing facts was part of the deliberative process
and revealed the mental process behind the decision.72
In another case, 73 plaintiffs attempted to compel the defendant to
use its computerized document retrieval system to provide responses
to interrogatories that sought identification of documents. The docu-
ment retrieval system comprised digests of documents contained in
a data base which were retrievable through the use of words or com-
binations of words contained in the index. Defendant convinced the
court that granting the motion would permit plaintiffs to learn which
key words and documents defendant believed to be significant. The
judge noted that the material sought had been prepared for litigation
and that putting it in the system did not render it unavailable to plain-
tiffs by other means. In addition, plaintiffs had not made a sufficient
showing of substantial need or hardship to overcome the protection
provided by Rule 26 (b) (3).
It is interesting to note that if respondent employed a full text
retrieval system and the opponent attempted to compel the respondent
to use it to answer similar interrogatories, respondent would have had
more difficulty arguing that opinions, theories, and mental impressions
would be discovered. A full text system permits retrieval on the basis
of any significant word or words in the full text of a document. Indeed,
one strength of a full text system is that the selection of significant
documents can be postponed until case issues are brought into sharp
focus. Thus the system does not require the party to make any pre-
supposition as to what the ultimate facts and issues will be, and the
party may choose to make no significant screening of documents prior
to introducing them into the data base. Even if the full text system
were prepared in anticipation of litigation, however, the moving party
would still have to show that it had a substantial need for the informa-
tion and that it could not, without substantial hardship, obtain the
materials by other means.7"
72. Even if they cited portions of the evidence verbatim, the assistants were
making an evaluation of the relative significance of the facts recited in the
record; separating the pertinent from the impertinent is a judgmental process,
sometimes of the highest order; no one can make a selection of evidence with-
out exercising some kind of judgment, unless he is simply making a random
selection.
491 F.2d at 68.
73. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices, No. MDL 163-RM (N.D. Cal.) (unpub-
lished opinion).
74. A court might hold that this burden was met by a party that could not sift
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IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that evidence is in computer-readable form, or that a
computer is being used to aid in litigation should not, in most cases,
change the basic questions for the lawyer or the court. The computer
simply performs faster and more accurately those operations formerly
accomplished manually. The Federal Rules of Evidence and Civil
Procedure, and the laws of some states, have been modified to provide
sufficient discretion so that courts can adapt to problems presented by
computerization. The reported cases indicate that courts have gen-
erally recognized that the computer's presence need not alter the basic
rules of evidence, discovery, or confidentiality. Lawyers should inform
themselves sufficiently about computers so that they will know when
one can profitably be used in litigation. At the same time, lawyers must
learn to distinguish between computer evidence and discovery questions
which can easily be resolved by analogy to cases involving manually-
generated evidence, and those which are unique and require special
consideration.
out significant documents from massive records in the case without the use of a cow-
puterized system, which it could not afford. See Tinder v. McGowan, 15 FED. RULES
SERv. 2d 1608 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
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